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While procedures surrounding police response to critical incidents and active 
shooters have drastically evolved since the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, 
the current paradigm is highly-focused on rapidly dominating and neutralizing the threat.  
While this is successful in stopping the propagation of further violence and injury, it does 
little to help those who are already injured and may die as a result of their wounds and 
the time it takes to provide them treatment.  Recent critical incidents in the US involving 
a large number of wounded have begun to shed light on the pitfalls of this current 
modus operandi.  Many of these mass casualty events like the Las Vegas Mandalay 
Bay shooting, or the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando Florida were large-scale 
events that persisted for several hours before police were able to feel confident that the 
threat(s) had been neutralized.  In instances such as these, it would be unacceptable to 
keep rescue outside of the theater of operations for this amount of time.  
In an effort to save as many lives during and after a critical incident, police 
departments should begin establishing agreements, protocols, and training with their 
jurisdiction's emergency medical services, fire departments, and rescue services to 
create fluidly integrated "task forces" that maintain the ability to engage hostiles and 
adequately treat and rescue wounded persons.  Furthermore, these "Rescue Task 
Forces" must maintain the ability to be a self-contained and self-sustaining unit capable 
of operating independently of one another as an element of a more-extensive force.  
The evolution of response to active attacks has wholly adopted the mantra, Stop the 
Killing; now law enforcement must collectively focus on the next phase, Stop the Dying. 
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While law enforcement agencies across the nation have changed the method 
they respond to active critical incidents in the last 20 years; the country has experienced 
a new level of terror in recent years inciting the need for even more dynamic evolution in 
response protocols to ultimately save lives and further protect the public.  On April 20, 
1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, nearly single-handedly ushered in a term that 
would become synonymous with mass murders involving firearms in the United States; 
on that day, they became the nation’s first "active shooters" (Blair, Nichols, Burns, & 
Curnutt, 2013).  The killing of 12 students and one teacher that day at Columbine High 
School in Littleton, Colorado, and more specifically, law enforcement's response to the 
incident, is still considered one of the largest news stories of its time and effectively 
initiated a pendulum swing of how law enforcement approached mass casualty critical 
incidents like active shooter events.  During the following years, law enforcement 
agencies across the nation began reassessing their active shooter/critical incident 
response protocols, shifting from a policy of containment to that of rapid engagement of 
the threat in an effort to "stop the killing" (Blair et al., 2013).  The direct benefit of this 
paradigm shift and subsequent adoption of more-universally trained tactics was 
observed during both the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 as well as the Sandy Hook 
school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut in 2012 (Armstrong & Frykberg, 2007).   
From an average citizen's standpoint, it is understandably difficult to consider two 
of the deadliest mass shootings (and the deadliest mass shootings at their time) as 
successful examples of police tactics; however, when looked at objectively, both critical 
incidents illustrate how evolutions in response protocols can potentially save lives.  
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Using the Columbine shooting as a baseline, officers did not make entry into the high 
school until 44 minutes after the first shots were fired, and while this seems like an 
excessively long period of time, the standard operating procedure of most police 
departments at that time in response to a shooting was to contain the incident and call a 
specialized unit trained for critical incident response; most commonly referred to as 
"SWAT" (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2013).  As that pendulum swung, police tactics 
nationwide began focusing more on training first line officers to rapidly dominate and 
neutralize the threat and to not wait for specialized units to arrive on the scene.   
As a result, during the Virginia Tech shooting, officers arrived on scene and 
made entry into the building only five minutes after the first 911 call was received, and 
tactical medics began triaging and treating the 59 gunshot victims inside (Armstrong & 
Frykberg, 2007).  Due to the rapid response by law enforcement and the timely manner 
that they were able to get medical personnel to the victims, all but one of the victims 
who was alive when officers made entry into the building would survive their wounds. 
The tactics used by law enforcement on that day at Virginia Tech would later go on to 
be cited as textbook examples of how first line patrol officers from various agencies 
could converge in a single location and, with almost no planning phase, utilize 
commonly taught tactics to aggressively advance on a threat to ultimately save lives 
(Armstrong & Frykberg, 2007).   
Several years later, Adam Lanza would walk into the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in Newtown, Connecticut on the morning of December 14, 2012, and shoot and 
kill 20 students and six faculty members, making this the most deadly "active shooter" 
event to date.  Once again though, this event became a benchmark of success in not 
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only law enforcement response protocol, but now in civilian active shooter training.  In 
the 12 years between the Columbine High School shooting and the Sandy Hook 
Elementary School shooting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recorded 140 
"active shooter" events around the United States, 33 of which were at schools (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2017).  During this interim, progressive school districts began 
working with law enforcement to train their educators and students on proper 
"lockdown" procedures to defend against these active shooters; Sandy Hook is one of 
these schools.   
When Adam Lanza walked into the office of Sandy Hook that morning, his 
intentions were made very apparent, and the staff was able to get the message to 
teachers to "lockdown" just before being killed by Lanza.  As Lanza made his way 
through the school, he was forced to bypass several locked doors before finding a 
classroom that was unable to be secured.  Almost all of the children killed that day 
would be in this one classroom.   
Law enforcement officers in Newtown had also received consolidated active 
shooter training and arrived and made entry into the school only four minutes after the 
first 911 call was received.  One minute later, 12 minutes after the first shot was fired, 
Lanza saw officers closing in on him and subsequently killed himself (Schultz, Muschert, 
Dingwall, & Cohen, 2013).  The combination of the training law enforcement officers had 
received and the lockdown protocols established by the school undoubtedly saved lives 
that day.  These three events act as observable benchmarks in the evolution of active 
shooter/critical incident response; however, the rules would soon change.        
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    In 2016 and then again in 2017, the United States would see the deadliest mass 
shootings by a single gunman in Orlando, Florida and Las Vegas, Nevada, respectively.  
On June 12, 2016, a gunman would open fire on a crowd inside of the PULSE nightclub 
in Orlando, Florida, ultimately killing 49 people and injuring 58.  Just over a year later on 
October 1, 2017 a shooter on the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort in Las Vegas, 
Nevada would engage a crowd of 22,000 people attending a country music festival, 
killing 58 people and injuring more than 700.  Aside from the number of killed and 
wounded, facets of these shootings presented other differences from the more 
commonly seen "school shooters."   
Both of these shootings were prolonged events, taking hours before law 
enforcement officials were able to "secure" the scenes.  Both were also geographically 
large in scale and spread over several city blocks or larger, spreading first responder 
resources thin, and finally, these two events involved an unknown number of assailants 
and incoming information that would cause officials to believe more suspects existed. 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017: Alsup, 2017).  These challenges, combined with 
a lack of communication between emergency medical services and fire departments 
caused delays in the victims of both events getting needed medical attention in time, 
inevitably leading to more of the victims succumbing to their wounds.  In an effort to 
save as many lives during critical incident and terrorism response, police departments 
should begin establishing agreements, protocols, and training with their jurisdiction's 
emergency medical services, to create fluidly integrated "task forces" that maintain the 
ability to engage hostiles and adequately treat and rescue wounded persons. 
 5 
POSITION 
In a study conducted in 1996 by Butler and Haggman, it was found that the 
majority of recorded battlefield deaths fell into three categories; isolated extremity 
hemorrhage, tension pneumothoraxes, and airway obstruction, with the most significant 
sample residing in the hemorrhaging group.  This study has initiated a shift in how 
prehospital care is administered following trauma and has since had a profound impact 
on preventable battlefield casualties, a doctrine known as tactical combat casualty care 
(TCCC) (Callaway et al., 2011).  During the Vietnam War, the case fatality rate (CFR) 
for preventable battlefield deaths was 14%.  After the implementation of TCCC and the 
education of more of the soldiers on this doctrine, the CFR during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom dropped to nearly half of the rate seen in 
Vietnam.  Furthermore, in more recent theaters, special operations forces who all have 
advanced life-saving training recorded no instances of preventable battlefield fatalities 
during their operations (Callaway et al., 2011).  This study and these statistics would 
conclude that the faster an injured party can get treatment from medically trained 
personnel, the higher their chances of survival. 
In a meeting conducted by the American College of Surgeons in 2013 involving 
members of the medical community, law enforcement, fire/rescue, emergency medical 
services (EMS) and military experts, each entity provided input on how to improve 
survivability factors during mass casualty events.  In the event which came to be known 
as the Hartford Consensus Conference, the panel identified that the "long-standing 
practices of law enforcement, fire/rescue, and EMS responses are not optimally aligned 
to maximize victim survival" (Jacobs et al., 2013, p.1399).  They further went on to 
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describe how this issue was exacerbated by the fact that the response of critical 
incidents like active shooters is primarily delineated and sequential, usually involving 
law enforcement securing the scene before any rescue operations begin (Jacobs et al., 
2013).  
     Before the assembly of the Hartford Consensus Conference, Minneapolis area 
officials observed a need for better protocols and collaboration between law 
enforcement and other responding rescue organizations after the violence and terrorist 
threats disrupted the 2008 Republic National Convention meeting (Autry et al., 2013).  A 
committee formed by the Metropolitan Medical Response Team (MMRT) comprised of 
Law Enforcement, Emergency Medical Providers, Fire Department and medical 
personnel conducted full-scale exercises involving the Minneapolis-St. Paul area 
emergency services.  Before these exercises, MMRT educated first responding 
personnel on progressive response techniques and the importance of getting medical 
attention to victims.   
Despite this training, in both scenarios the group noted several decencies.  The 
law enforcement (LE) group was too focused on threats and possible threats thereby 
neglecting living victims.  Conversely, emergency medical and fire personnel staged 
well away from the incident and would not approach until the scene was declared fully 
secure.  Ultimately, this resulted in a failure of both LE and rescue command staff to 
share information which increased the time it took to get treatment to victims (Autrey, 
Hick, Bramer, Berndt, & Bundt, 2014).  While the response was seen as a failure, the 
positive outcome of the scenarios was that it illustrated a need for a shift in protocols, 
training, and response tactics.  Fortunately, for Minneapolis, they instituted progressive 
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procedures for correcting the noted deficiencies and only a couple years later were able 
to put these new practices to the test in a real-world environment.   
On September 27, 2012, an employee who was terminated earlier that morning 
returned to his former workplace, bent on revenge, entered the office building and 
began shooting other employees.  As officers arrived and began searching for the 
threat, other officers started identifying injured persons and established a safety 
corridor.  When EMS arrived on the scene, they were able to utilize this safety corridor 
and initiate triage and treatment of the wounded under the protection of officers.  This 
was all done well before the "all clear" was given by officers and resulted in EMS saving 
several lives that day (Autrey et al, 2014).  It is clear by these examples and studies that 
the current method of allowing police to completely secure a scene before medical 
services will deploy is too segregated and will only result in delaying treatment to 
critically injured parties.  Conversely, though, it has been shown that more closely and 
seamlessly integrating these responses will ultimately get victims faster lifesaving 
treatment. 
Citing yet another reason to push toward further resource integration among 
emergency services, in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as a way to better prepare the nation 
for how to handle domestic incidents.  The purpose was to establish a standard 
framework so that agencies from the local level to the federal level could seamlessly 
integrate utilizing a standardized organizational structure, personnel management 
paradigm, and official paperwork (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  Another 
resolution of NIMS was to provide scaffolding under which, police, fire, EMS, and other 
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rescues and response agencies could synergistically integrate their responses to 
disasters, terrorist attacks, mass casualty incidents, or pre-planned special events.  
Within the NIMS structure, task forces are an often used asset during incidents and are 
defined by DHS as "any combination of resources assembled in support of a specific 
mission or operational need" (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 67).  These 
task forces differ from other assets used under the NIMS structure in their flexibility; 
"single resources" and "strike teams" are both comprised of a single type of resources, 
police officers or firefighters or medical personnel for example.  Conversely, task forces, 
are a conglomerate of multiple types of resources, thus allowing one task force to tackle 
various roles within an incident (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).   
During the PULSE nightclub shooting in Orlando, as officers were arriving on the 
scene, they were met with hundreds of patrons running out of every exit of the club and 
in all directions.  At the same time, they were continually receiving information about the 
possible shooter(s), and much of this information was conflicting, increasing the 
confusion to how to organize and manage an appropriate response properly.  Due to 
the uncertainty of how many shooters were still at large, along with information received 
about possible secondary improvised explosive devices (IED) still on scene, officers 
were tasked with extricating wounded outside of the nightclub to a makeshift triage 
center only 200 feet from the establishment, well within the recommended security 
perimeter of 1000 feet.  It was at this triage center where medics could provide 
advanced life-saving measures to the wounded and prepare them for transport to the 
local hospital.  The "golden hour" is widely regarded as the standard time frame that a 
critically wounded victim must reach a proper medical facility (hospital) to greatly 
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increase their chances of survival.  Due to the model utilized in Orlando, all of the 
wounded still alive when officers arrived to evacuate them were transported to the local 
emergency room within 40 minutes of the initial shooting.  As such, 58 of the 69 victims 
removed from the club survived their injuries (Department of Justice, 2017). 
The model used in Orlando was a direct testament of how interdisciplinary task 
forces can be safely deployed inside of an area that has not been deemed entirely 
secure by law enforcement, and how the method of their operation directly attributed to 
the survival of many of the victims.  If officers had been forced to extricate wounded 
completely outside of the security perimeter to the staging area, it would have meant 
moving injured five times as far, over ten city blocks, taking an unreasonable amount of 
time which would have cost far more lives. 
A year later in 2017, during the shooting at a Las Vegas festival where 58 people 
were killed and over 700 were injured by a shooter from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay 
Bay Resort, the same model was utilized during the initial response (Alsup, 2017).  As 
officers began searching for and engaging the threat, combined task forces began 
establishing triage centers and casualty collection points well within proverbial "ground 
zero."  This incident was a case where officials were unable to readily establish a 
consolidated security perimeter due to the scale of the event.  Directly following the 
event, 911 calls also led law enforcement officials to believe there may have been more 
than one shooter.  Task forces combined of law enforcement officers as well as medical 
personnel were then sent to reported locations of additional wounded that had escaped 
the immediate vicinity as well as reports of other possible shootings occurring nearby 
(Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 2018).  The development of sending these 
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combined assets to remote locations allowed commanders to deploy a single resource 
to a report of wounded with the ability to negotiate most obstacles and resolve the 
situation; negating the need to pull further resources from the primary scene. 
COUNTER ARGUMENTS 
The traditional method utilized by most jurisdictions when responding to an 
injured party that may not be in a safe area generally involves the EMS unit staging in a 
safe area away from the target location until police can secure the scene.  This model 
has been conventionally used in typical day to day responses as well as during critical 
incidents.  This paradigm is based on the fact that a vast majority of medical personnel, 
whether embedded with law enforcement or activating in a separate capacity are 
unarmed non-combatants, which significantly decreases their ability to defend 
themselves should they be attacked (Kaplan et al, 2012).  Keeping the response 
segregated and sequential assures that these unarmed non-combatants are entering a 
safe area to provide treatment to wounded individuals.     
In the case of any violent encounter, responding personnel should identify and 
communicate "hot, warm, and cool zones" (Pennardt & Schwartz, 2014).  Hot zones are 
areas that contain a direct and immediate threat; warm zones are areas where potential 
threats may exist but there is no immediately known threat, and cold zones are areas 
where there is no reason to believe a threat would exist.  Very little medical care can be 
provided in a hot zone under direct threat conditions and is generally relegated to 
moving a victim to a covered position and further attempting to neutralize the threat.   
There is no disputing that unarmed medical personnel does not belong in the hot 
zone; however, according to TCCC doctrine, the majority of pre-hospital care provided 
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to a wounded patient should be done in the warm zone to assure that the victim can 
receive advanced life-saving measures as early as possible.  While law enforcement 
cannot completely designate a warm zone as "safe", (which is the reason it is still 
designated as a warm zone and not a cold zone), un-armed medical personnel can still 
operate in relative safety under the protection of police officers or other security 
personnel (Pennardt & Schwartz, 2014). 
In a survey given to 256 emergency medical service medical providers, 89% felt 
that they were prepared to respond to an active shooter incident to provide medical care 
after being trained to respond to such, up from 41% before they received such training 
(Jones, Kue, Mitchell, & Eblan, 2014).  Furthermore, over half of those surveyed, 56%, 
felt comfortable enough to enter a building with an active shooter, un-armed, to provide 
medical treatment to victims.  This statistic rose drastically among those with prior 
military experience to 78% (Jones et al., 2014).  This study indicates that the majority of 
trained EMS personnel are willing to enter hot zones to provide treatment, which 
suggests that a much higher percentage would feel comfortable in their level of training 
to operate in warm zones efficiently. 
Emergency medical personnel are not the only ones to train to operate jointly 
during critical incidents.  The majority of law enforcement active shooter response 
curriculum includes how to move through warm and possible hot zones while safely 
escorting teams of unarmed persons.  Though the use of specific formations and 
tactics, combined task forces are trained to not only move safely from point to point, but 
also how to establish casualty collection points (CCPs) and more importantly, how to 
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defend those areas while medical personnel triage and treat wounded (Blair et al., 
2013). 
Another argument against an integrated response deals with one of the lessons 
learned from the Columbine High School shooting.  As mentioned before, the pendulum 
swing that occurred after Columbine drove law enforcement all over the nation to 
broaden the scope of training that first line officers would receive, thus giving them the 
ability to respond to a more inclusive breadth of incidents.  An outcome of this increase 
in training disciplines was the adoption of the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) 
program employed by the U.S. military into the law enforcement community.  Due to its 
immense success overseas during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom, many officers and entire departments received training on how to provide 
initial treatment to battlefield injuries, most common of which was gunshot wounds.  It 
would subsequently stand to reason that it is more useful to train all law enforcement 
officers to treat injuries that they are most likely to encounter during active shooters and 
critical incidents, giving them the ability to treat wounded and defend themselves and 
others (Callaway et al., 2011). 
Many believe that TCCC was instituted so that law enforcement officers could 
provide medical treatment to wounded victims in the cases of mass causality events, 
when in fact, tactical medicine was never truly intended to be utilized for wounded third 
parties.  The primary goal of TCCC was to give trained personnel the ability to treat 
themselves or other first responders so that they may continue the mission.  Officers 
generally only carry enough equipment into an incident to treat themselves and are 
taught during the TCCC program that their issued individual first aid kit (IFAK) is used to 
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treat themselves.  The fundamental basis of tactical medicine is that medical priorities 
will almost always fall behind the primary law enforcement mission unless proper 
medical personnel is present to facilitate a shift in mission parameters (Tang & Kelen, 
2007). 
Taking the argument a step further, some agencies may explore the option of 
expanding the medical training of their law enforcement officers to certify them as full 
paramedics.  As state certified paramedics, they would then retain the ability to intubate 
patients, start intravenous fluid delivery, administer certain medications and conduct 
many other advanced life-saving measures.  While this option would indeed expand 
their overall response capability, the training necessary to certify an officer as a 
paramedic is quite extensive.   
In the state of Texas, the Department of Health and Human Services certifies 
paramedics and according to chapter 157 of the Texas Administrative Code (1999), an 
individual must undergo a minimum of 1,000 hours of training to be certified as a 
paramedic.  This regulation subsequently means that every officer an agency would 
want to become certified as a paramedic would have to be gone from the department 
for a minimum of six months while they attended a certification program.  Most 
departments would be unable to account for the absence this creates and absorb the 
cost to send enough of their officers through this program to be a practical solution. 
RECOMMENDATION 
It is clear that the active shooter and terrorist threat will continue to plague the 
United States for the foreseeable future.  While the evolution of law enforcement has 
been proven over the past two decades to better address the growing threat, this 
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progression will only need to continue to assure they can protect the nation's people 
from a new breed of domestic terrorists.  Recent events like the PULSE nightclub 
shooting in Orlando and the Mandalay Bay shooting in Las Vegas have demonstrated 
that a fluidly-integrated response by law enforcement and emergency medical 
personnel can greatly affect the case fatality rate of a large scale critical incident and 
can, most importantly, be done in a manner that is safe for first responders. 
The initial goal of law enforcement at any active shooter or critical incident is, and 
should be, the rapid neutralization of the threat; to "stop the killing" in an effort to save 
as many lives as possible.  This overarching principle, however, is not only achieved by 
preventing further violence but by expeditiously providing advanced life-saving 
measures to critically wounded victims, a fundamental message of the Hartford 
Consensus Conference (Jacobs et al., 2013).  The veracity of this tenant has been 
illustrated in events all over the nation including Virginia Tech, Minneapolis, and 
Orlando and has directly attributed to the success of the medical mission during those 
incidents.  The integrated response model has also proved to be a much more efficient 
construct during critical incidents, chiefly during large scale or mass casualty events that 
may involve hundreds of wounded or may be spread among several city blocks.  The 
NIMS "task force" approach to incident resolution allows for a much more efficient 
delineation of responsibility and removes the traditionally segregated and sequential 
response, thus increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall operation 
(Kaplan et al., 2012). 
Being progressive in the theater of public safety does not come without risks.  
Part of being on the leading edge of this field generally means pushing the boundaries 
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of what some traditional practitioners would consider safe.  Integrating un-armed 
medical personnel into law enforcement led task forces penetrating into areas that could 
potentially contain threats is counter-intuitive to most current operating procedures.  
This tactic, however, has proved both useful and safe when appropriately employed.  
Through comprehensive training of both law enforcement personnel and emergency 
medical personnel, officers learn effective strategies to protect un-armed persons, and 
medical personnel gains the confidence to effectively operate in warm zones during 
active shooter incidents (Jones et al., 2013).   
Opponents of the integration of services would also argue that law enforcement 
officers with basic lifesaving training through programs such as Tactical Combat 
Casualty Care, should maintain the ability to provide all necessary medical services 
during active shooter and terrorist incidents until the proverbial "all clear" can be 
announced.  This philosophy, however, can be quickly unraveled with a closer look at 
the TCCC program as it focuses its training almost entirely on the medical treatment of 
the officer or first responder, not injured third parties (Tank & Kelen, 2007). 
In the previous two years, this nation has witnessed the two deadliest active 
shooter events in its history, events whose death toll and wounded can only be rivaled 
by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  These events though, sparked an evolutionary leap in 
how law enforcement, EMS, and fire/rescue can work together in a manner previously 
believed to be unsafe and reckless to save countless lives.  This development is only in 
its infancy though, and the public safety community must continue to aggressively fan 
the flames of urgency to assure that a prototypical response tactic becomes the basis 
for established, adopted doctrine across the nation.  The public safety agencies in the 
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Minneapolis-St. Paul area has demonstrated that a pragmatic approach to adopting this 
new paradigm can be operationally effective after they initiated both "table-top" style 
discussions involving police, EMS, fire/rescue, and medical personnel in response to 
violent encounters and terrorist threats following the 2008 Republican National 
Convention.  These table-tops subsequently led to full-scale exercises involving 
members from all responding agencies, and while these exercises unveiled a clear lack 
of training and communication, the involved agencies were able to educate and re-train 
their personnel accordingly.  These efforts quickly paid dividends when Minneapolis was 
faced with its own active shooter in 2012.  Responding agencies were accredited with 
saving the lives of several of the wounded due to new response tactics that involved an 
integrated response and injecting emergency medical personnel into a warm zone to 
provide advanced life-saving measures to the victims (Autry et al., 2013). 
Using the Minneapolis model as a primer, jurisdictions need to begin assessing 
their resources and initiating conversations among their emergency service branches 
about their level of readiness.  These conversations should then evolve into a series of 
"table-top" discussions utilizing historical data and events to further focus and refine 
response practices. From there, these entities should begin establishing procedures 
and memorandums of understanding (MOU) that outline specific protocols that will be 
followed by line personnel who should then be successively educated and trained on 
such.  This training must involve as many people as possible, be reality-based, and be 
continued to assure its effectiveness.  In the past two decades, this nation's public 
safety community has reluctantly but fully accepted that it is not a matter of if these 
events are going to occur but when.  It is now time to shift that archetype once again.  
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The community no longer has the luxury to ponder what they will do when an incident 
occurs but instead must focus their efforts on how they will prevail. 
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